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COMMENTS
COURTS MARTIAL - JURISDICTION
SERVICE - CONNECTED CRIME*

-

In the recent case of O'Callahan v. Parker1 the United States
Supreme Court reversed a trend expanding courts-martial jurisdiction since 1863.
Petitioner James F. O'Callahan, a sergeant in the United
States Army, broke into a girl's hotel room and assaulted and
attempted to rape her while he was on leave and dressed in
civilian clothes. After being delivered to the military police, he
was tried and convicted by a court-martial for attempted rape,
housebreaking, and assault with attempt to rape, in violation of
Articles 80, 130, and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 2 The Army Board of Review and later the United States
Court of Military Appeals affirmed his conviction. His subsequent petition for the writ of habeas corpus, filed in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
was denied, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court-martial had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner for the crimes in question, since they were not service*O'Ca~lahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct. 1683 (1969).

1. 89 S.Ct 1683 (1969).
2. Article 80 of Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. § 880 (1964) provides:
(a) An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense
under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation

and tending, even though failing to effect its commission, is an
attempt to commit that offense.
(b) Any person subject to this chapter who attempts to
commit any offense punishable by this chapter shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct, unless otherwise specifically

prescribed.
Article 130, 10 U.S.C. § 930 (1964) provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who unlawfully enters
the building or structure of another with intent to commit a
criminal offense therein is guilty of house-breaking and shall
be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Article 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964) provides:

Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all dis-

orders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring

discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not

capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty,
shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or sum-

mary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the
offense, and shall be punished at the discretion of that court.
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connected, but that he was entitled to an indictment by a grand
jury and a trial by a petit jury.
I=RODUCnON

War or preparation for war is a serious endeavor, requiring
considerable sacrifices of comfort, freedom from restraint, and
liberty of action. Since experience has demonstrated the consequences that result when these sacrifices are not made, the law
of the military must be capable of prompt punishment to maintain discipline and to insure that efficient armed forces are
ready and available to defend this country should the need
arise.' Courts-martial are a means to this end.
JURISDICTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The O'CaZlahanr Court said that ". ..

history teaches that

expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain
carries with it a threat to liberty."5
The common law in England made no distinction between the
crimes of soldiers and those of civilians in time of peace. All
subjects were tried by the same civil courts: if a soldier deserted,
he could only be sued for breach of contract, and if he assaulted
an officer he was punishable by an indictment for assault. The
common law recognized an exception that permitted armies to
try soldiers "in the field" in time of war.(
Continued struggles by the Crown against Parliament and
the common-law courts resulted in the Crown's gradual expansion of courts-martial jurisdiction during times of peace to maintain control over the army.7 This expansion was intermittent
however, and in 1,765 Parliament's increased strength resulted in
the British Articles of War which provided that a soldier could
3. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct. 1683 (1969).
4. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22, 29 (1955).

5. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1689 (1969).
6. 2 Campbell, LivEs OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES 91 (1st ed. 1849), cited in

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24 n. 44 (1957). The history of courts-martial
jurisdiction is extensively reviewed in Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Reid v.

Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23-30 (1957). See generally WINTHROP,

MILiTARY LAw

(2d ed., Reprint 1920); Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and
the Standing Army: Another Problem of Courts-Martial Jurisdiction, 13
VAND. L. REV. 435 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Duke & Vogel]. These are
excellent works on courts-martial jurisdiction history upon which the author
AND PRECEDENTS

has considerably relied.
7. See 3 RusnwoRTH, HIsToRcAL CouraxeroNs APP. 76-81, cited in Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24 n. 44 (1957).
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not be tried by court-martial for a civilian offense; instead
military officers were required to use their efforts to insure that
the accused soldiers would be tried before a civilian court.8 The
American Articles of War adopted by the Continental Congress
in 1776 and later the 1806 Articles of War were in essence a
reproduction of these British A.rticles.9
In America the trend toward expanding court-martial jurisdiction began in 1863 when Congress authorized them, in time
of war, to try various civil crimes and permitted the imposition
of the death penalty.' 0 The requirement that officers were to
deliver the accused soldiers to civil courts for trial for civil
crimes was made inapplicable, in time of war, by the 1874 Articles of War." In 1916 courts-martial jurisdiction was extended
to certain non-capital offenses in time of peace; 12 the general
article was modified to allow court-martial for all crimes and
offenses which were not capital ;13 and the requirement that officers deliver soldiers accused of civil crimes to civil courts for
trial was further reduced.' 4
In 1950 when the Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted, courts-martial were given authority, even in time of peace,
to prosecute and impose the death penalty with respect to murder and rape committed within the United States, removing the
last remaining limitation on jurisdiction over civil crimes.'8
CoNsTrrUTowAT Aiuio=r

Trial by court-martial in the United States is the exercise of
an exceptional jurisdiction springing from the power granted
the Congress in art. I, § 8, clause 14, "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces . .

."

as

supplemented by the "necessary and proper clause", art. I, § 8,
clause 18, "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers . .

.,,6

Since it is the primary purpose of armies and navies to fight
or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise, trial of
8. See Duke & Vogel at 445, 449. This work illustrates the statutory

changes which have expanded courts-martial jurisdiction since the American

Revolution.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 449-450.

11. Id. at 451.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.
See Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 235, 237, 247 (1960).
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soldiers to maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army's
primary fighting function. 7 The O'GaZlahan Court therefore
concluded that in determining the scope of the constitutional
power of Congress to authorize trial by court-martial only the
"least possible power adequate to the end proposed" should be
allowed.'
Clause 14 was derived by modifying a similar provision that
existed in the Articles of Confederation, which conferred on
Congress "exclusive right and power of... making rules for the
government and regulation of [the] land and naval forces, and
directingtheir operations."19 This derivation reveals that Clause
14 was designed to accomplish two objects. First, Congress was
not to retain the power of command which it had experienced
under the Articles of Confederation. This was in conjunction
with the express grant of authority to the President to act as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Second, Congress,
not the President, was to have the power to govern and regulate
the Armed Forces, including the punishment of military
offenses.20 The reason for this was stated by Justice Harlan:
"What [the Constitutional Founders] feared was a military
branch unchecked by the ZegisZature and susceptible of use by an
arbitrary exeoutive powers." 21 Justice Harlan thus concluded
that the Founders did not intend to limit the power of Congress in regulating the Armed Forces, which included the
power to establish courts-martial. Similarly, Alexander Hamilton stated that Congress' power to prescribe rules for the government of the armed forces "ought to exist without limitation,
because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, or the corresponding extent and
22
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.
While it seems that Congress was intended to have the sole,
broad power to govern and regulate the armed services, which
includes making rules for courts-martial, it is apparent that the
Constitutional Founders had no idea that Congress would expand courts-martial jurisdiction to its present scope.23 After
raising the issue of the scope of Clause 14, the O'CalZahan Court
evaded it by saying that Clause 14:
17. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
18. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1969).

19. ARTICLES OF CONFEDEIATIOx, art. IX (1781).
20. See Duke & Vogel at 447.

21. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 68 (1957) (Emphasis by Mr. Justice Harlan).
22. THE FEDERALIST, No. 23.

23. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23, 24 (1957).
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. . . need not be sparingly read in order to preserve

those two important constitutional guarantees [the
right to trial by jury and indictment by a grand jury].
For it is assumed that an express grant of general
with
power to Congress is to be exercised in harmony
24
Rights.
of
Bill
the
of
guarantees
express
UNQUENESS OF COURTs-MARTIA

Courts-martial are unique in that the authority enabling their
existence is in article I of the Constitution rather than article
III wherein the Judiciary finds its enabling authority. Unlike
the Judiciary, courts-martial are governed and regulated by the
Congress and commanded by the President-they are an integral
part of the armed forces, not an autonomous branch of the govthe civil courts
ernment. As a result the supervisory powers 2of
5
over courts-martial are considerably limited.
In earlier decisions the general rule existed that, in a collateral
proceeding brought in the federal courts by a soldier or sailor
convicted by court-martial, the inquiry would be restricted to
the issues of whether the court-martial had jurisdiction over the
person accused 26 and the offense charged 27 and whether the
sentence imposed was within the power of the court-martial. 28
During that period the Court refused to hear all questions bearing on the fairness of the proceedings resulting in the accused's
conviction. 29 This limited scope of inquiry into courts-martial
convictions was reaffirmed as late as 1950.30
In Burnl v. Wilso?0 1 the Court expanded this rule and said
that it was the limited function of the civil courts to determine
whether the military had given fair consideration to the accused's claims with respect to matters affecting the fairness of
the trial, i.e., brutality, coerced confessions, etc. The Court refused to expand this rule further in United States v. Augenlic,) 3 2 a case decided earlier this year, which indicates that its
24. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct 1683, 1691 (1969).
25. See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1886).
26. Id.
27. Smith v. Whitney, 100 U.S. 167 (1886).
28.
29.
30.
31.

Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1886).
Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953).

32. 89 S.Ct. 528 (1969). The Court indicated it would overturn a court-

martial decision only when the "barriers and safeguards are so relaxed or forgotten . . . that the proceeding is more a spectacle . . .or trial by ordeal . . .
than a disciplined contest." Id. at 533-4.
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scope will remain constant, at least for a while. Jurisdiction
being the only issue before the O'Ca/aThan Court, it left the
Bums rule unaffected.
BILL OF RIGHTS V. COURTS-MATIAL JURISDICTION

The Bill of Rights entitles citizens to certain safeguards
against oppressive governmental actions. The fifth and sixth
amendments, as well as article III, § 2, contain safeguards which
pertain to criminal prosecutions."3 Whether the Bill of Rights
applies to members of the armed forces has been a question which
has caused considerable controversy.8 It was long ago held that
Clause 14 creates an exception to the normal method of trial in
civilian courts as provided by the Constitution and permits Congress to authorize military trials of members of the Armed
Services without all the safeguards given an accused by article
III and the Bill of Rights.3 5
More recently, in Burn v. Wilson the Court said that:
the rights of men in the armed forces must perforce be
conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the
agencies which must determine the precise balance to
be struck in this adjustment.3 6
33. The fifth amendment provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment of indictment
of Grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger ....
The sixth amendment provides in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed...
Article III, § 2 provides in part:
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where
the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or
places as the Congress may by law have directed.
34. See generally Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. Ray. 293 (1957) (arguing that the Bill
of Rights do apply to members of the armed forces); Weiner, Courts-Martial
and the Bill of Rights; The OriginalPractice, 72 HAav. L. Rrv. 1, 266 (1958)
(arguing contra).
35. E.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858); Ex parte Reed,
100 U.S. 13 (1879).
36. 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953). See generally Weiner, Courts-Martial and the
Bill of Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HAnv. L. REV. 266, 280 (1958).
Weiner said that since all proceedings before courts-martial are criminal
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Although jurisdiction was the only issue before the Court, it
is evident from reading the O'alZa an opinion, written by
Justice Douglas, that he was deeply concerned about the rights
of members of the Armed Forces and felt considerable disdain
towards courts-martial. He said:
A civil trial... is held in an atmosphere conducive
to the protection of individual rights, while the military trial is marked by age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice ....
Courts-martial as an institution
are... inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of con7
situtional law.
While he attacked the propriety of the courts-martial system
as a whole, Justice Douglas particularly attacked the method of
selecting the members of a court-martial, the military counterpart to the jury, and the command influence which generally
exists on them. He said:
A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of the defendant's peers which must decide unanimously, but by a
panel of officers empowered to act by a two-thirds
votO.8
Although the accused may request that one-third of the members
be enlisted personnel, 39 "[i]n practice usually only senior enlisted
personnel, i.e., non-commissioned officers, are selected." 40 Justice
Douglas did not mention that if the accused were of private
grade, the membership of the court-martial could be composed
entirely of enlisted personnel. The only requirement is that no
member shall be subordinate in rank to the accused. 41
The Court did not mention that the accused could request that
certain members be removed, although until recently the members themselves determined whether the reason for the request
was relevant or valid. 42 Also there is no limit to the number of
in nature, the sixth amendment's provision that "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an im-

partial jury ... as a matter of language alone includes prosecutions by courtsmartial. Since, however, the significance of this and other constitutional provisions is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, we
know that this does not follow. The soldier or sailor never had a right to trial
by jury." 72 H1Av. L. REv. 266 at 280 (1958).
37. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1969).

38. Id. at 1686.
39. Uniform Code of Military justice [hereinafter cited as UCMJ], Art.

25(c) (1), 10 U.S.C. 835 (c)(1) (1964).

40. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1686 n. 2 (1969).
41. Art. 25 (d) (1) of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825(d) (1) (1964).
42. Art 41(a) of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1964).
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removal requests that the accused may make. 43 Another safeguard available to the accused, which the Court did not mention,4
was the peremptory challenge, of which he was allowed one.
Concerning command influence, Justice Douglas said that the
"influence on the actions of the court-martial by the
officer who convenes it, selects its members and the
counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command authority over its members is a pervasive one in
military law...-45
Cases have proven that command influence exists, however, these
cases also prove that it does not go unchecked. 40 Undoubtedly
this is the weakest element of the courts-martial system, but the
extent of its pervasiveness is difficult to determine. It must be
admitted that at the time O'Callahan was tried, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice gave the commanding officer considerable opportunity to exercise his authority over the courtmartial.47 Yet it must also be realized that in 1957 when O'Callahan was tried, Mapp V. Ohio48 had not been decided, which
meant that he had many safe-guards that did not exist in a considerable number of the states.49 As a result O'Callahan probably experienced a fairer trial than he would have had if he had
been tried in a civil court.
43. Id.
44. Art. 41(b) of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1964).

45. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1686 (1969).
46, See, e.g., Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on

the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 780-781 (1962), wherein Col. F. B. Wiener,

one of the foremost authorities in military law, listed cases illustrating com-

mand influence and discussed its dangers.
47. Art. 25(d)(2) of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2) (1964), provides

that the convening authority, usually the commanding officer, shall select the

members of a court-martial; Art. 26 of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964), provides that the commanding officer shall select the law officer who presides over
the court; and provides that the law officer may discuss the "form" of the
findings in private, out of the presence of the accused or his counsel; Art.
27(a) of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1964), provides that the commanding
officer shall select both trial counsel and defense counsel.
48. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
49. Art. 31(a) and (b) of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964), protects the accused from compulsory self-incrimination or coerced confessions; Art. 32 of
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964) provides that the accused be informed of charges
against him before attending an investigatory inquiry; allowed the right to have
counsel represent him at such inquiry; and allowed to cross-examine any witness who testifies against him; Art. 27 of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964) provides the accused the right to counsel; Art. 44 of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 844 (1964)
protects the accused from double jeopardy; Art. 45 of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 845
(1964) protects the accused from indirect guilty pleas.
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It is interesting to note that at no time did the Court indicate
that the form of indictment used by the armed forces was not
fair. On the contrary, those military code provisions related to
indictment appear to be as fair as that used by article III
courts,5" and while this "indictment" is not by a Grand Jury,
the difference is one of form rather than substance.
Electing to use a balancing approach, the Court weighed
O'Callahan's rights as a citizen against the governmental interests which support the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction and
concluded that O'Callahan must prevail. In his dissent Justice
Harlan said:
* [i]f one engage[s] in a balancing process, one
cannot fairly hope to come up with a meaningful
answer unless the interests on both sides are fully explored. The Court does not do this. Rather, it chooses to
ignore [the] strong and legitimate governmental interests .. .51
COURTS-MARTIAL

JuIisDxcTIoN-Tm]

NEw RiULE

Since 1950 when the Uniform Code of Military Justice was
enacted, it has been decided that discharged soldiers could not
be court-martialed for crimes committed while in service;52
neither could courts-martial try civilian employees of the Armed
Forces overseas;r a nor civilian dependants of military personnel
accompanying them overseas. 54 While these decisions reversed
the expansionary trend of courts-martial jurisdiction, O'CalZahan, which applied to members of the armed services, the people
most frequently tried by courts-martial, makes the reversal of
the trend considerably more pronounced.
The crux of 0'Cal/ahan was the interpretation of the fifth
amendment which provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger
(emphasis added).
50. See Arts. 30, 32, 34, and 35 of UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 830, 832, 834, and
835 (1964).
51. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1695 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
52. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
53. McElroy v. Guargliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
54. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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While the exception expressly applies to the right to indictment
by a grand jury, using the authority of Ex parte Quirin,5 the
Court inferentially applied it to the sixth amendment right to
trial by jury. Determining that the alleged crime did not arise
"in the land or naval forces", the Court concluded that jurisdiction must rest solely in the civil courts, since neither institution
was provided in a trial by court-martial. 0
Prior to O'Callakan it had been generally understood that
one's status, whether he was a member of the Armed Services,
was determinative of courts-martial jurisdiction. 7 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan said that "this court has consistently asserted that military 'status' is a necessary and suffiownt condition for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction."58
The Court majority conceded that in many cases it had decided
that court-martial jurisdiction did not extend to persons who
were not members of the Armed Forces. In its opinion, however,
these decisions did not conclude that courts-martial had jurisdiction over members of the Armed Forces, regardless of the
alleged crime committed. The Court decided that while status
was necessary for jurisdiction, its ascertainment did not "complete the inquiry regardless of the nature, time, and place of the
offense." 59
Thus the status of the soldier's crime, whether it is connected
with the Armed Forces, rather than the status of the accused,
becomes the rule for determining courts-martial jurisdiction.
PROBLE3

OoF INTEPRnTING O'CALLAHAN

The factual situation in O'G/aZahan resulted in an extremely
narrow holding. Sergeant O'Callahan had been on leave; the
crime was committed off the military post; the victim was a
civilian who was performing no military duties; the situs of the
55. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
56. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1690-91 (1969). It would seem that the fifth amendment
clause, "when in actual service in time of war or public danger" would modify

"except in cases arising in the land or naval forces," making it applicable only
in time of war or public danger. However it was held at a very early date that
the clause modifies only "Militia", and the general rule has been that indictment
by grand jury is never necessary "in cases arising in the land or naval forces."
E.g., Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); Ex parte Mason, 105 US 696
(1882).
57. E.g., Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907); Johnson v.
Sayre, 15 U.S. 109, 114 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 184-85
(1886).
58. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1692 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
59. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1969).
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crime was within the United States, committed during peacetime
when civil courts were readily available; and furthermore, the
offense did not involve the flouting of military authority, the
security of a military post, or the integrity of military property.
Indeed it would be difficult for a member of the armed services
to commit a crime more distantly related to the Armed Services.
But now that status is no longer a sufficient condition for
courts-martial jurisdiction, the courts will have to decide when
the crime is service-connected. As Justice Harlan said, "[T]he
Court has thrown the law [of court-martial jurisdiction] ...
into a demoralizing state of uncertainty. ' 60
While the Court of Military Appeals has not yet made a
determination of the scope of O'Callalian, the special courtsmartial boards have considered it to be extremely narrow. They
have held that their jurisdictions vested in an off-post assault
against a superior non-commissioned officer attempting to persuade the offender to return to duty;61 when statements were
uttered on-post with the intent to promote disloyalty among the
troops;62 when the victim of an off-post robbery was also a
member of the Armed Forces;63 when a soldier made an off-post
sale of marijuana to an undercover CID agent;64 and when the
accused stole a credit card from a fellow soldier and forged his
name to gasoline invoices when he was off-post. 65 From these
decisions it is evident that courts-martial boards intend to restrict the scope of the O'6allahanrule to its particular facts.
The Court indicated that the "nature, time, and place of the
offense," as well as the accused's "status", are the conditions to
be used in determining jurisdiction.6 6 Nature would seemingly
indicate whether the crime would be to the prejudice of military
authority and discipline; time would seemingly indicate whether
the accused was on duty; and place would seemingly indicate
whether the alleged crime occurred on-post.
60. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1692 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
61. CM 419911, Bell (1969), cited in 1 The Advocate No. 6 at 7 (Aug. 1969).

This is a monthly Newsletter for military defense counsel.
62. CM 419988, Bell (1969), cited in 1 The Advocate No. 6 at 7 (Aug.

1969).
63. CM 420194, Gunter (1969), cited in I The Advocate No. 6 at 7 (Aug.
1969).
64. CM 420337, Mueller (1969), cited in I The Advocate No. 6 at 8 (Aug.
1969).
65. CM 420264, Vipond (1969), cited in 1 The Advocate No. 6 at 8 (Aug.
1969). Noting that the war powers control, and believing that the U.S. was

presently at war, several courts-martial boards have held that O'Callahanhas
no present viability. E.g., CM 419489, Elwood (1969); CM 420522, Williams
(1969), cited in 1 The Advocate No. 6 at 6 (Aug. 1969).
66. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1688 (1969).
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If the crime meets any one of these conditions, combined with
the accused's being a member of the Armed Forces, it should be
considered service-connected. For example, regardless of whether
the accused was on duty or on-post, if the victim was an officer
or another soldier, the crime should be service-connected since it
would prejudice military authority and discipline; regardless of
whether the accused was on-post or the victim was another soldier, if the alleged crime was committed while the accused was
on duty, the crime should be service-connected; and regardless
of whether the accused was on duty or military authority and
discipline was prejudiced, if the alleged crime occurred on-post,
even though the victim may have been a civilian, the crime
should be service-connected.
A questionable situation arises when the victim of the crime
is a civilian who is dependent upon a member of the Armed
Forces for his livelihood. While the Armed Forces have a responsibility of protecting these dependents, it is doubtful
whether a crime against one of them would be any more to the
prejudice of military discipline than a crime against any other
civilian. The fact that the victim was a dependent should not by
itself be determinative of whether the alleged crime was serviceconnected. Rather the inquiry should be whether the crime
occurred on-post or whether the accused was on duty when the
crime was committed.
It would seem to be unquestioned that a serviceman's crimes
involving the flouting of military authority, the security of a
military post, or the integrity of military property would be
service-connected.
Concerning conditions relevant to jurisdiction, Justice Harlan
said:
the Court intimates that it is relevant to the jurisdictional issue . . . that the petitioner was wearing
...

civilian clothes rather than a uniform when he committed the crimes ....

And it implies .

.

. that officers

may be court-martialed for purely civilian crimes... 7
It is not clear to what extent the Court intended these facts to
be relevant. However, it seems that they were used merely to
strengthen the basis upon which the decision was made. 68 It is
67. Id. at 1696 (dissenting opinion).

68. At the end of his opinion when he emphasized the facts of the case and
their lack of connection with the Armed Forces, Justice Douglas did not mention that O'Callahan had been dressed in civilian clothes. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1691
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highly doubtful that the decision would have been any different
had they not been mentioned, because the Court said:
[w]e see no way of saving to servicemen and women
in any case the benefits of indictment and of trial by
jury, if we conclude that this petitioner was properly
tried by court-martia e 9
In order to have a rule that is as coherent as possible, it seems
that the "status-nature-time-place" distinction will have to be
followed. Any deviation from this standard will probably lead
to more confusion than already exists.
RETROACTIVE EFFECT

Articles 2 and 17 of the UCMJ 70 provide that members of the
Armed Forces are subject to courts-martial jurisdiction if their
alleged crimes come within its provisions. O'Callahan,in effect,
overrules these statutes on constitutional grounds, leaving the
question to be answered as to whether the decision will have
retroactive effect.
The early position taken by the Court was that when it ruled
a statute unconstitutional, the decision had a retroactive effect
as to all rights, duties, and liabilities created pursuant to the
statute.7 1 This position was changed in Chicot County Drainage
Dist. 'v. Baxter ,State Bank, 72 wherein the Court decided that in
determining whether a declaration of unconstitutionality will
have retroactive effect, consideration must be given to its effect
on vested rights, status, prior determinations, etc.
In Johnson v. New Jersey,73 expressing the modern view as

applied in criminal law, the Court said that retroactive effect is
to be given only to those decisions which affect the integrity of
the fact-finding process where the previous standard posed a
convincing danger of convicting innocent persons.
(1969). And when he spoke of officers being court-martialed for civilian
crimes, he was speaking of 18th century beliefs that the "'honor' of an officer
was thought to give specific military connection to a crime otherwise without
military significance." The context in which he used the word "honor" indicates that he is of the opinion that such is not the belief today. Id. at 1690
n. 14.
69. O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S.Ct 1683, 1691 (1969).
70. 10 U.S.C. §§ 802, 807 (1964).
71. Norton v. Shelby, 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
72. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
73. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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In O'Cala
laha Justice Douglas said that
. . . military tribunals have not been and probably

never can be constituted in such way that they can have
the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution
has deemed essential to fair trials...74

While he had his qualms about the fairness of courts-martial,
Justice Douglas did not indicate that they evinced dangers of
convicting innocent persons. Furthermore the Court has recently
said that a non-jury trial is not necessarily an unfair one.7'5
Therefore the conclusion would seem to be that O'Callahan will
not have retroactive effect.
CONTCLUSION
The philosophy of the O'CaZa7an Court can best be described
by words that Blackstone once wrote:
[M]artial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is .

.

. in

truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather
than allowed as law. The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it
countenance; and therefore it ought not be permitted
in time of peace, when the King's courts are open for
all persons to receive justice according to the laws of
76
the land.

What mattered to the Court was not whether O'Callahan was
denied a fair trial by a court-martial, but that he did not receive
a trial in a civil court which provided those institutions guaranteed to citizens.
Designed especially for the Armed Forces, courts-martial were
not intended to imitate trials by jury. But, as noted above, the
Court itself has recently said that a non-jury trial is not necessarily an unfair one.77 The Military Act of 196878 eliminated
some of the problems that existed in the court-martial system
when O'Callahan was tried, especially those pertaining to command influence. Efficiency ratings of servicemen cannot be
based on court-martial performance or zeal as was done in the
74. 89 S.Ct. 1683, 1685 (1969).
75. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
76. 1 BLACKSTONE'S COIMENTARIES 413, quoted in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 26-27 (1957).
77. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
78. Pub. L. No. 90-632; 82 Stat. 1335 (Oct. 1968).
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past;7 9 an independent judiciary has been established, divorcing
the presiding officer of the court-martial from the command of
the convening authority;8O and the accused may request his
court-martial to be by the military judge alone, instead of by
appointed members. 8 ' The fundamental difference between civil
courts and courts-martial is still the same, however. While civil
courts put more weight on the side of the individual's rights,
courts-martial give more weight to the interests of the Armed
Forces. If it were any other way, discipline in the military
would be a farce.
Due to the uncertainty of the new rule promulgated by the
O'CallahanCourt, combined with the influx of two new Justices,
it probably will not be long before similar cases reach the Court
in an effort to test the scope of this new rule. But assuming
that the new Court will be somewhat more conservative than
before, it would not be unlikely for the scope of the rule to
remain considerably limited.
The rule developed in O'CaZlahanis a good one, philosophically, although the method used in developing it may be regretted in that the strength of the attack on the court-martial
system was unwarranted, and the attack was unnecessary to the
decision. Jurisdiction was the only issue before the Court, therefore this case could have been decided without even mentioning
the inherent weaknesses of courts-martial. Beginning with the
premise that a soldier is also a citizen, realizing that this country's system of justice is based on a jury trial, yet also recognizing the need of maintaining discipline in the military, it is only
logical to conclude that a citizen-soldier should be entitled to
those rights guaranteed to any other citizen when the crime
which he has been accused of committing has no connection with
his duties as a soldier.
JT

Rm

E.

RnHoDES,

JR.

79. Id. at § 2(13).
80. Id. at § 2(9) (c). Individuals presiding over most courts-martial will be

Military Judges who are members of the Judge Advocate Generals Corps.
They will be given efficiency ratings by their superior officers within that

branch of the military service, not by the authority convening courts-martial,
usually the commanding general.

81. Id. at § 2(6).
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